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Cisterino: Engaging the Diaspora

Engaging the Diaspora: Prospects and Pitfalls
Janna Cisterino
Current international migration flows are quite
remarkable. In 2011, the World Bank estimated
that more than 215 million people, or
approximately 3% of the world’s population, lived
outside their countries of birth.1 There are three
general types of sending states or countries that
produce a significant number of emigrants: laborexporting states, states that have gained
independent statehood after a major outflow of
their nationals, and states in conflict.2 One of the
major contributors to emigration trends in the
current era is the expansion of capitalism. The real
and growing demand for immigrant labor in
industrialized countries has encouraged migration
on a greater scale than in the past.3 Of course, other
dynamics also play a role in current migration
trends. There have long been linkages between
emigrants and their home countries, but the scale,
structure, and strength of these relationships has
changed in recent years in significant ways. This
paper will examine the logic behind sending states’
engagement with their diasporas, the mechanisms
that they employ in achieving this goal, as well as
some of the potential drawbacks of engagement.
Globalization and new, improved
technologies, such as in communication and travel,
have altered the dynamics of transnationalism and
emigrants’ relationships with their sending states,
making linkages between the diaspora and the
homeland denser and more rapid.4 It is now far
easier and cheaper for emigrants to call home, to
visit their home countries, and to consume media
produced in their home countries. These
developments have strengthened the identification
of emigrants with their sending states and cemented

their conception of themselves as a part of the
political communities of their home countries.
These transnational communities have challenged
the traditional conception of national communities
as defined by a common connection to some
territory. As Kim Barry says, “Migration
decouples citizenship and residence.”5 Similarly,
as Adamson argues, there is an “uneasy fit between
the state as an administrative unit and the state as a
spatially discrete homogenous political identity.”6
Emigration disrupts the simplistic conception of the
state and its nationals as a neat package bounded by
the state’s borders. Indeed, when emigration from
a state is common, it can become a defining feature
of the national experience. In the context of this
paper, a diaspora will be defined as a social group
of emigrants who have sustained a collective
identity, maintained ties with a real or imagined
homeland, and displayed an ability to address the
needs of its members through organization and
transnational links. 7
Even in the context of transnational processes,
politics often remains about local issues. In many
cases, transnational politics is highly territorial in
focus and goals, although its actors have been
deterritorialized. 8 In the past, emigrants’ economic
success and social status depended on their
successful acculturation and integration into
mainstream circles of society in their host country.
However, these things now often rely upon
emigrants’ strong transnational links.9
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continuation of labor migration and thus the rising
importance of remittances as they grow relative to
other types of financial inflows.14 Further,
remittances have become the top source of foreign
currency for many labor-exporting countries.
Finally, trends in other forms of financial inflows to
developing countries have made remittances even
more significant. For example, capital market
flows and foreign direct investment (FDI) have
fallen in the past few years, but remittance inflows
continue to grow. 15
The economic effects of remittances are wideranging. In their most obvious function the
remittances that family members in the sending
state receive allow them to better meet their
immediate consumption needs and improve their
quality of life. The importance of this function of
remittances is often belittled. Admittedly,
improving the standard of life of individuals in the
sending country through outside contributions is
less desirable than doing so by generating internal
economic growth, but it is still significant. The
majority of remittances that are not spent on
immediate consumptions needs such as food and
clothing are spent on health care and education. 16
A healthier and better-educated work force is better
able to contribute to economic growth.
Remittances are also important on a broader
macro-economic scale. First, remittances have
multiplier effects on the economy of the sending
state.17 This means that a given inflow of
remittances will generate a greater increase in the
receiving country’s gross output than the amount of
remittances. By spending remittances, families
contribute to the growth of their countries’
economies by providing income for others and
creating jobs. When the remittances that families
receive are greater than their current spending
needs, they raise the national savings and provide
funds for loans and investment, thus generating
further economic growth. Further, as mentioned
earlier, remittances are an important source of
foreign exchange for sending countries. This

The Diaspora and Economic Development
One of the reasons that sending states engage
their diasporas is to obtain resources for economic
development. However, there is serious
disagreement about whether emigration is
beneficial for a state’s development. The negative
perspective posits that emigration and the sending
state’s resultant reliance on workers’ remittances
results in dependency, instability, developmental
distortion, and a resulting economic decline that is
not worth the temporary economic gains.10
Remittances are viewed as a potentially instable,
unpredictable source of revenue for the state. A
reliance on emigrants and their contributions to the
state for developmental purposes sends the state
down a dangerous path to political instability and
unpredictable social change without the necessary
institutional adjustments. The influx of money
ultimately changes the state in ways that it is
unprepared to constructively cope with. The
positive perspective views emigration and the
financial inflows that stem from it as forces for
political peace and positive social changes in
families and gender roles.11 Although contributions
from emigrants are certainly not a quick-fix, they
do provide an important source of revenue to
bolster economic development.
Remittances
Remittances from emigrants are now the
primary source of financial inflow for many
sending countries.12 Official estimates claim that
the sum of remittances is greater than overall
development aid worldwide. Unofficial estimates
go even further, asserting that remittance flows may
be twice as large as development aid.13 The large
growth in remittances has sharply increased
developing states’ economic dependence on them
in the past few decades. One of the reasons for the
trend in the growth in remittances is the impact of
neoliberal economic policies enacted by many new
democracies in the developing world. These
policies have contributed to the start or
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exchange.21 Critics of the positive impact of
remittances also argue that they are a potentially
instable source of revenue. However, quantitative
evidence does not support the notion that there is a
steep and sudden decline in remittances after a
reduction in migration.22 Rather, it has been found
that remittances actually increase in the wake of
such a reduction after a short interval of adaptation.
There are a number of reasons for this. First, a
decrease in the outflow of emigrants does not
decrease the current number of emigrants who are
living abroad and sending remittances home. Many
of these individuals remain in their host countries
when overall migration decreases. Next, even
when overall official estimates of migration
decrease, emigrants continue to leave, both legally
and illegally. It has also been found that in many
cases when entire families are reunited in host
countries they continue to remit to their home
country regardless. Finally, when a reduction in
migration results in emigrants returning home, they
often bring a lump sum of earnings with them.
Another argument disputing the importance of
remittances is that they do not alter the fundamental
weaknesses of economies. Instead, they serve as a
temporary fix that masks the true economic
problems. Further, remittances have failed to
narrow the North-South economic gap, although
they have narrowed income disparities within
sending countries.
There are also problems associated with
remittance-sending infrastructure. Emigrants often
perceive official remittance channels as corrupt,
inefficient, and unreliable. 23 Admittedly, in many
cases they are. However, although using formal
channels is more expensive than using informal
channels in many cases, there are lower risks
associated with their use. 24 A further obstacle is the
legal and institutional impediments that often stand
in the way of emigrants utilizing formal channels,
such as a lack of proper identity documents.25 This
is particularly a problem for illegal immigrants.
Sending states can take a number of steps to
improve the quality of official remittance-sending
infrastructure and thus encourage emigrants to
utilize these formal channels. First, states must
expand access to these channels to compete with

foreign currency can be used to finance the
country’s deficits, debts, and import costs.18
Finally, remittances can provide the resources for a
transition to what would otherwise be unsustainable
development.19 Again, remittances in themselves
cannot solve development problems, but they do
provide an economic boost and can serve as a
bridge to sustainable development.
Those emigrants who send remittances to their
home countries do so for a variety of reasons,
including pure altruism, pure self-interest, informal
agreements between these individuals and their
families, and portfolio management decisions. 20
First and most obvious is pure altruism, or a desire
to either improve one’s family’s standard of living
or to better one’s home country. A second motive
is pure self-interest. One case of this is when
emigrants want to inherit from their older family
members in the home state and expect that sending
remittances will ensure that by establishing
goodwill. A second example is when emigrants
send remittances to ensure that the property or
assets that they have left behind in the sending
country are properly cared for, sometimes because
they expect to return to their home country in the
future. Next, there are informal agreements
between emigrants and their family members in
their home countries. In this case, emigrants remit
as a form of insurance against financial problems in
their host state, but also as a form of family loan.
These informal agreements blend aspects of both
the pure altruism and pure self-interest models.
Finally, a fourth motive of emigrants in sending
remittances to their home countries involves
portfolio management decisions. For example,
saving in the home country may be more profitable
for emigrants. The motives behind an individual
emigrant’s decision to remit will not fit neatly into
one of these categories. Rather, they will likely
include several aspects of each.
However, there are a number of disadvantages
associated with the role that remittances play. First,
as mentioned earlier, some analysts argue that
remittances distort the economies of sending
countries. They contend that remittances are rarely
used to generate capital or create jobs. Instead,
they are primarily expended on consumer goods.
These consumer goods have a high import content
and thus reduce the country’s supply of foreign
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more readily available informal remittance systems.
Next, sending states should make efforts to reduce
the transaction costs associated with these channels
by combatting corruption and inefficiencies as
these problems are one of the main reasons that
emigrants do not utilize them. States should also
refrain from interfering with private transfers by
trying to force them through official channels or in
to specific programs. 26 Coercion will only further
discourage emigrants from using this infrastructure.
Finally, states can try to assist emigrants whose
lack of proper identity documents prevents them
from using official channels. For example,
Mexican consulates in the United States have
begun to issue “matriculas” or identification cards
for Mexican citizens living in the U.S.27 However,
such measures are not a full solution as matriculas
are accepted by some banks for the purpose of
establishing a bank account and sending
remittances, but not by others.

members of its diaspora preferential treatment
under investment and banking laws. 29 Foreign
investment is an important source of foreign
exchange and revenue for spurring economic
growth in sending states. In addition, many
sending states prefer to obtain funds from their
diasporas rather than other foreign investors or
international capital markets. The diaspora is often
trusted more than other potential contributors by
the sending state. A final important form of
financial contributions is emigrants’ direct
contributions for specific initiatives. Many local
governments in sending states actively reach out to
emigrants to obtain funding for local development
projects. 30
Knowledge and Skill Contributions
Financial contributions are not the only way in
which emigrants can assist their home countries.
Contributions of human capital, such as skills and
knowledge, are also important. The potential
human capital contributions from diasporas are
significant, especially in Africa.31 Such
contributions are particularly salient in civil service
reconstruction. The knowledge and skills of the
diaspora can help to rebuild the state’s institutions,
increase civil service capacity, and thus contribute
to stability and peace. Diasporas are especially
important in reconstruction because donors,
whether individuals or other states, have short
attention spans and will likely not commit to
provide assistance for an extended period of time.
The motives of the diaspora in contributing
human capital to their home countries are varied.
One would assume that the less time an emigrant
has spent away from his home country, the more
likely he would be to assist in such efforts.
However, it has been found that there is not
necessarily a linear relationship between the time
an emigrant spends away from his home country
and his interest in it.32 Crises in the homeland are
one important factor in sparking emigrants’ interest
in and human capital contributions to their home

Other Financial Contributions
Although remittances are by far the largest
source of financial inflow from emigrants for
sending countries, there are other important forms
of financial contributions. Taxes are one other way
in which sending states can extract resources from
their diasporas. However, imposing a tax on the
diaspora is problematic in many regards. First,
states generally lack the enforcement power to
coerce individuals who are not resident in their
territory to pay taxes.28 Additionally, many sending
states do not have sufficient resources to pursue
these taxes. One surprising example of the success
of a tax on the diaspora is the case of Eritrea. The
vast majority of the Eritrean diaspora paid a
voluntary 2% income tax that was instituted after
Eritrea gained its independence. This may be a
function of Eritrea’s extension of dual citizenship
to the diaspora and the role it accorded the diaspora
in crafting the state’s constitution at independence.
Sending states can also provide incentives for
emigrants to invest in their home countries. India is
at the forefront of this strategy, giving select
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country. Emigrants’ desire to express their identity
is also a causal factor in this case, as was seen with
other types of contributions. Finally, in a more
pragmatic sense, emigrants often become involved
in human capital transfers to maintain or acquire
resources.33
Knowledge transfers are especially pertinent in
rebuilding governance in post-conflict societies.
There are three dimensions to post-conflict
reconstruction: a rehabilitative dimension oriented
to the past, a resolutive dimension oriented to the
present, and a preventive dimension oriented to
both the present and the future.34 Good postconflict governance needs to ensure effectiveness,
legitimacy, and security. External actors, including
diasporas, can influence reconstruction and prevent
the reemergence of conflict by contributing
resources, aiding in socialization, and providing
political incentives for stability.
There are a number of specific programs that
harness the human capital of emigrants to assist
sending states. The United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) administers the Transfer of
Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals
(TOKTEN) program, which focuses on the role that
emigrants’ human capital can play in economic
development in sending states.35 Other related
programs include the International Organization for
Migration’s (IOM) Return of Qualified African
Nationals (RQAN) and Migration for Development
in Africa (MIDA) programs and the Afghanistan
Expatriate Program (AEP) organized by the Afghan
government and donors. These programs are
designed to combat the brain drain in developing
countries and gather the knowledge and skills
necessary for development. There are a number of
forms of knowledge exchange that these programs
can focus on, including permanent and temporary
emigrant return. However, a number of studies
have found that permanent return programs are not
very cost-effective and are thus less desirable to
resource-strapped states. In addition, recruitment
for programs that involve emigrants’ return,
whether temporary or permanent, is dependent on
emigrants’ secure legal status in their host states.
An emigrant is unlikely to take part in a program
that could endanger his chance of remaining in his
host country.
There are a number of steps that sending states
can take to increase emigrant participation in

knowledge transfer program. First, states must be
clear about the program’s objectives, both to the
emigrants and to themselves. This is essential to
effectively plan recruitment strategies and develop
participant selection criteria. Next, there should be
clarity about the duration of the program and
emphasis should be placed on the specific skills and
credentials that will best contribute to the
program’s success. The incentives and
compensation provided to emigrants should be
targeted, have minimal visible perks, and be based
on a market analysis.36 The problems associated
with excessive compensation will be discussed
later. Next, the sending state and any international
organization that it is working with should identify
and utilize existing diaspora organizations and
networks for recruitment and program support.
Emigrants who participate in these groups are more
likely to maintain interest in their home country and
be willing to contribute human capital through
knowledge transfer programs. Finally, and perhaps
most importantly, these programs should be
conducted under the authority of the sending state’s
government. Attempts to bypass the state by other
actors, perhaps with good intentions, only serve to
weaken the state’s legitimacy and create
governance problems in the future. Any other
actors, such as international organizations, that are
involved should not try to co-opt the sending state’s
authority.
Yet, there are a number of potential problems
associated with knowledge transfer programs. As
already mentioned, bypassing nascent or weak
governments with NGOs, IGOs, and emigrants can
undermine the governments’ authority, and it can
also drain local capacity and entail greater costs.
Employing emigrants, even under the auspices of
the government, can also be problematic. First, the
repatriation of the diaspora can lead to the
emergence of a new political elite and create or
exacerbate political tensions. This elite is likely to
be out of touch with their home country to some
extent due to the time they have spent away.
Further, it is hard to recruit members of the
diaspora with appropriate skills for these projects.
Those with talent are generally among the first to
leave the country, and have often been away for a
significant period of time. In addition, they are the
most likely to successfully integrate into their
receiving societies, and thus are less inclined to
return even for short-term projects. Those who are
recruited must often be offered compensation at

33
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international wage levels and may be resented by
the less well-paid indigenous civil service. 37

Diasporas are concerned about a number of
issues and pressure different actors to achieve their
desired political outcomes. First, diasporas care
about their status in both their sending and host
states. They would lobby both states on these
issues. Their status is regulated in such matters as
citizenship, migration status, voting rights, and
their ability to participate in the socioeconomic
lives of their sending towns or regions. A second
area of diaspora interest is issues that affect their
sending countries. This sector includes concerns
such as human rights, good governance, and
political participation in the homeland, both for
themselves and for their fellow nationals. Finally,
there are issues with bilateral impact, including
trade policy, humanitarian relief, development
policy, diplomatic recognition, and economic
sanctions.41 The political character of the sending
country shapes the issues that the diaspora focuses
on. In countries where democracy is just emerging,
emigrants usually focus on local politics and
development. On the other hand, in countries
where there is a high degree of political
institutionalization and partisanship, emigrants are
more likely to demand that they be allowed to
participate in the political process.42
Diaspora advocacy takes on a number of
forms. Emigrants can function as lobbyists, putting
direct pressure on a government to change its
policies. Other forms of direct political
participation include electoral participation and
public demonstrations. Emigrants may also initiate
lawsuits to elicit a change in government policy or
conduct media campaigns to alter public opinion.
Finally, emigrants can support political parties or
causes through fund-raising. 43 Diasporas’
interaction with political parties has taken on new
forms in the age of transnational politics. The
inclusion of political organization organized abroad
in the democratic political system of the sending
states is new and quite remarkable.44 Most diaspora
advocacy is directed toward either their sending or
receiving countries. However, actors such as
NGOs, international organizations, media, business,
labor unions and churches are also targets of
diaspora action.45
However, as with every other aspect of
diaspora engagement discussed thus far, there are

Political Advocacy
Diasporas can also be influential in political
advocacy on a number of issues. The motives of
the diaspora in advocacy are generally quite similar
to those for maintaining ties with the sending state
in general. These motives include acquiring power
and resources, assuaging guilt about leaving the
sending state behind, maintaining a collective
memory or myth of their home country, expressing
an ethnic group consciousness, and keeping alive
the expectation of return, among others. An
important addition to the motives in the case of
advocacy is a desire to improve bilateral relations
between the emigrants’ sending and receiving
states. The most prominent examples of diaspora
advocacy are the Israeli and Irish diasporas. The
Israeli diaspora has been instrumental in lobbying
their host governments to obtain support for Israel,
and the Irish diaspora has been instrumental in
fund-raising and mustering political support for a
united, independent Ireland.38
Effective diaspora advocacy hinges on a
number of factors. First, the diaspora must have
adequate resources and the means to use them. 39 In
other words, they must have a supply of money and
the organizations and mechanisms to use this
money to achieve a desired political outcome. The
sending state’s support of a diaspora is crucial in
establishing legitimacy for the group and assisting
in the coordination of advocacy efforts. The target
country’s political system is also a factor.
Democratic, liberal governments are far more open
to emigrants’ lobbying efforts than other types of
governments. In recent years, democratization in
many sending countries has opened a new avenue
for diaspora political participation. New
technologies that facilitate transnational politics are
also being seized upon by both non-state political
entrepreneurs and state elites who are using the
organizational form of “diaspora” and diaspora
mobilization as a means of generating material
resources and political support.40

37
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potential drawbacks and difficulties associated with
diaspora advocacy. First, there is the issue of
political fragmentation within the diaspora and thus
considerable difficulty in ascertaining who can
legitimately speak for the diaspora. Mexico has
addressed this problem through the Consultative
Council of the Institute for Mexicans Abroad,
which consists of elected leaders from diaspora
communities.46 With this institution, Mexico has
been able to conduct relations with members of the
diaspora who are at least somewhat representative
of the diaspora’s views. A second issue is when a
diaspora’s advocacy is undermining, not
supporting, a sending state’s position. One notable
example of this is the case of Turkey and its
Kurdish diaspora. The Kurdish diaspora has been
largely antagonistic towards Turkey and has
challenged the official conception of Turkish
nationalism. In host countries across Europe, the
Kurdish diaspora has been able to interact and build
networks that bypass, challenge, and contest
identity construction in Turkey.47 Situations such
as this pose serious problems for sending countries,
as they do not have the authority or capacity to
silence dissent abroad.

emigrants in home country politics. Of the 144
countries on which data is available, 80% allowed
emigrant participation in elections in some form. 48
According to David Leblang, 91 of 186 countries
allow expatriates to vote, and 84 countries permit
dual citizenship.49 The most prevalent form of
external voting is voting abroad for one’s home
district. This method compromises 61.8% of the
sample of external voting in Collyer and Vathi’s
study. 50 It has also been found that democracies are
more likely to extend these benefits to their
diasporas than non-democracies. However, some
non-democracies have also accorded their diasporas
external voting rights. For example, emigrants
were able to participate in the 2007 Moroccan
elections.51
However, the concept of dual citizenship is
convoluted. There are two common, and quite
dissimilar, interpretations of this term. 52 The first
conception of dual citizenship is one that conforms
to the everyday understanding of the term. In this
conception, when a state extends dual citizenship to
members of the diaspora this includes the full rights
accorded to citizens resident in the state, including
voting. However, there is another interpretation of
the term. The extension of dual citizenship can also
serve as a more symbolic gesture. When states
adhere to this interpretation, emigrants are
recognized as members of the national community,
but they are not granted all of the rights and
benefits of traditional citizenship, such as voting
and holding office.53 This restricted dual
citizenship is sometimes termed dual nationality,
though this is far from universal practice. One
must be careful in distinguishing between those
states who allow full political participation for nonresident citizens and those who do not as the term
dual citizenship is used with a consistent meaning
in neither academic nor policy publications.
Diasporas are interested in and feel entitled to
dual citizenship for a number of reasons. On an
emotional or psychological level, emigrants desire

Dual Citizenship/Nationality and Voting Rights
One of the ways in which sending states can
engage their diaspora populations is by extending
voting rights or dual citizenship to these
individuals. In this section, the extension of dual
citizenship to the diaspora and allowances for
external voting will be treated together. However,
one should note the difference between the two.
External voting simply refers to allowing citizens to
cast votes outside the sending state. If a sending
state does not allow dual citizenship, emigrants
who have acquired the citizenship of their host
country will not be able to participate. In addition,
a sending state that allows dual citizenship may not
have provisions for external voting. In this case, an
emigrant who wants to vote in his sending
country’s elections must return home.
Although many states perceive the
phenomenon of external voting as anomalous and
politically unpalatable, it has in fact become quite
common in recent years. Various sources provide
slightly different data on external participation in
elections, but all point to a growing voice for
46
47

48
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legitimates ethnic cleansing.57 If external voters are
excluded, the electorate and thus the resulting
elected government will be heavily biased towards
the social group that conducted the ethnic
cleansing. States must reject the idea that a
segment of their population can be removed from
political participation by the use of force and their
expulsion from the state.
There is quantitative evidence that there is a
positive and significant correlation between the
extension of dual citizenship to emigrants and
financial inflows into the sending state. Leblang’s
study estimates that India, which does not currently
permit dual citizenship or external voting (except in
very limited circumstances), would likely increase
the remittances that it receives from its diaspora by
between 2% and 2.5% if it extends dual
citizenship.58 Other forms of financial inflows are
affected as well. For example, both the migrant
stock (the number of emigrants from a particular
sending state that a host state has) and dual
citizenship have positive and statistically
significant effects on the allocation of foreign
economic assistance to the sending state. This also
holds true with respect to the cross-border flow of
portfolio investment.59 It seems that many states
recognize the financial benefits of extending dual
citizenship to their diasporas, as when a state’s
national debt increases by 1%, the likelihood that it
will extend dual citizenship to its diaspora increases
by .15%.60 Although the strength of this
relationship is far from overwhelming, it
demonstrates sending states’ recognition of the role
their diasporas’ contributions can play in ensuring
their financial well-being. However, in the case of
the relationship between the extension of dual
citizenship and emigrants’ intention to return to
their home states, only a marginal effect has been
documented.61
There are a number of ways in which the
voting process for the diaspora can be conducted.
The easiest and least costly method as far as the
sending state is concerned is to only allow
emigrants to vote if they return in person to their
home district. However, this imposes a heavy
burden on emigrants who desire to vote. The
second mode of participation is voting abroad for

to conceive of themselves as parts of the state
whose territory they have left behind. They want to
be recognized and legitimated by their sending
states’ governments as being a part of their
respective communities. Second, many emigrants
believe that they still have a stake in their home
countries. Improved communication and
transportation technologies allow emigrants to
remain in contact with family members in the
sending state, to send remittances, to visit, to retain
property and invest in the sending state, and to
harbor hopes of returning one day. These linkages
make emigrants feel that they are a still an integral
part of their home countries.54 Finally, voting and
other non-resident citizenship rights provide a way
for emigrants to maintain and develop legitimate,
state-sanctioned forms of political
transnationalism. 55 Although they may not utilize
them in every case, emigrants desire access to
formal transnational channels. Again, this is a
function of their desire for recognition, the need to
be treated as legitimate actors.
The main interest for sending states in
extending dual citizenship is the expectation that
they will be able to expect more from their
diasporas in return. Sending states hope that the
extension of dual citizenship will cement
emigrants’ identification with their home countries
and thus elicit increased contributions. They hope
that according rights to emigrants will instill them
with a sense of obligation. In addition, extending
political rights may foster a sense of trust between
the sending state and the diaspora. This is crucial
in establishing and maintaining productive working
relationships. These relationships can channel
increased contributions, whether they be financial
or of a different nature, to the sending state. The
extension of dual citizenship may increase the
financial inflow from emigrants, but can also make
emigrants more likely to return home, a
contribution of human capital.56 Another rationale
behind extending voting rights to the diaspora is
specifically related to post-conflict societies. In
countries where conflict has intentionally resulted
in the expulsion of a particular ethnic or other
social group, it is crucial that external voting be
allowed. When this is not the case, the state
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one’s home district. In this method, emigrants are
able to vote in their host countries, whether at their
countries’ embassies or polling stations established
specifically for the occasion, and have their votes
counted as if they were still resident in their home
district in the sending country. The final type of
electoral participation is voting abroad for one’s
own dedicated representatives. Voting abroad for
dedicated diaspora representatives has largely been
a post-1995 development. A final distinction is that
in some cases the diaspora is only allowed to
participate in certain types of elections, such as
legislative or presidential.
However, there are a number of concerns
associated with the extension of dual citizenship or
providing external voting to the diaspora. First,
there is the principle of one man-one vote or the
idea, in this context, that an individual should not
be able to voice their opinion in elections in
multiple countries and thus have more influence
than others. When members of the diaspora are
able to vote both in their host and home states, this
principle is violated. Sending states do not
confront this issue when they don’t permit dual
citizenship but allow external voting for their
emigrants who have not acquired another
citizenship. A second point of contention is
whether the diaspora should be able to participate
in the elections of a polity whose laws they are no
longer subject to. The argument here is that
individuals do not have the right to decide how
others will be ruled when they will not have to deal
with the consequences of their electoral decisions
as well. A related issue is whether diasporas are
too far out of touch with their sending states’
politics to effectively and intelligently participate in
elections. The time they have spent away from
their home countries may make them ignorant of
current concerns and needs.
Next, diaspora political participation can
contribute to ethnic and religious tension in the
sending state in some cases. For example, although
India has not extended voting rights to its diaspora,
it has encountered problems with Hindutva, or
Hindu nationalist, organizations that contribute
money to Hindu rightist parties in India and try to
influence Indian politics in other ways. Hindutva
ideology and organizations have become
increasingly visible in many South Asian diaspora
communities since the early 1990s.62 For example,
62

the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (World Hindu
Congress), a Hindu Indian diaspora organization,
contributed to ethnic and religious violence in the
2002 Gujarat riots.63 If voting rights were extended
to the Indian diaspora, it is likely that Hindutva
political parties would receive an electoral boost.
In general, individuals who are not subject to the
consequences of their electoral choices are more
likely to engage in spiteful, destructive ethnic
politics. The diaspora may have a romanticized
conception of their homeland and may hold on to
past grudges to maintain group solidarity.
Alarmingly, Paul Collier has found that a country
that has recently ended a conflict and has a large
diaspora population is far more likely to fall into
conflict again than a country that does not.64
Finally, the extension of dual citizenship can
provoke controversy in the host country.65 It can
exacerbate worries in the host state about the
diaspora’s loyalty. However, this proves less
controversial when voting rights are not included in
the model of dual nationality rather than dual
citizenship. All of these concerns and others make
dual citizenship far more controversial than other
types of emigrant programs, such as cultural, social,
or economic initiatives.66
Diaspora Engagement Policy
In the past 5 years, diasporas’ engagement
with their sending countries has increased
dramatically. This is a result of emigrants being
better organized in their host countries, the
development of new communication and
transportation technologies, and sending states’
recognition of the importance of engaging with
their diasporas.67 States enacting diaspora
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engagement policies come from all geo-political
regions.68 They are also of various development
levels and have both civic and identity-based
models of citizenship. Emigrant attitudes to their
sending states are extremely varied and their levels
of participation in transnational politics vary
widely.69 Sending states’ policies toward their
diasporas vary as well.
For the most part, sending states continue to
conceive of their diasporas as primarily economic
resources based on their contributions through
remittances, investment, the consumption of the
sending states’ products, and their
entrepreneurship.70 Although only a tiny
percentage of this financial inflow is sent directly to
the government, sending states realize that it is
beneficial nonetheless. States also try to promote
the upward mobility of emigrants, perhaps out of
pure altruism, but more likely to increase
emigrants’ income and increase the likelihood that
they will contribute to their home countries.
Emigrants who were driven out by conflict often
don’t have much to contribute to their home
countries, but in some cases, such as with Bosnian
and Eritrean refugees, these diasporas contribute a
significant amount of money. 71 Sending states also
want to mobilize political support and control
subversive political dissidence in the diaspora.72
Many of the current relationships between
emigrants and sending states are informal, ad hoc,
and sporadic.73 They are based primarily on
individual and group interactions and directed
specifically at the family, village, or local level.
Many countries lack an official diaspora policy.
This lack of official policies on emigrants hampers
intensive and sustained cooperation between
sending states and their diasporas, especially with
regard to issues of development. Formal,
institutionalized relationships at the national level
between sending states and their diasporas would
be beneficial in several ways. Such cooperation
would lend emigrants credibility, give them a
political voice, and increase their contributions to
their sending countries.74 Formal relationships
would aid in the development of better diaspora and

development-related institutions as well.
Additionally, sending states may be able to contain,
manage and co-opt potentially dangerous groups,
such as ethnic nationalist or separatist
organizations, through engagement. For example,
many Indian emigrants have engaged in longdistance nationalism, including fund-raising and
charity for the homeland. Much of this money has
been collected by Hindu nationalist organizations,
often without the donors’ knowledge. 75 Instead of
ignoring the problem or trying to marginalize these
groups, the Indian government should try to engage
them and redirect the money in more beneficial
directions.
Formal engagement can also be useful in
linking diaspora organizations with other pertinent
actors. In general, emigrant organizations are more
helpful in development work when partnered with
sub-national development actors, such as NGOs,
local governments in the sending country, or the
private sector.76 In these situations, the interest and
resources of emigrants can be shaped by the
development experience of other actors who have
more technical expertise in the area. Without
proper guidance, diaspora organizations may direct
their energies and resources in inefficient ways.
Alan Gamlen posits that there are three
different types of relationships between sending
states and their diasporas: relations of power,
relationships of communication, and finalized
activities. 77 Relations of power concern the relative
control that these actors can exercise upon each
other. For example, some states have the ability to
exercise a great deal more influence on their
diasporas than other states do. When states hold
the upper hand in their power relationships with
their diasporas, they are better able to structure
their interactions in ways that benefit the state. In
cases where diasporas exercise a considerable
amount of power, perhaps more than their sending
states, they are able to direct their relationship in
ways that reflect their interests most effectively.
However, the outcomes of both of these types of
power relationships are dependent on states’ and
diasporas’ perceptions of their interests. If these
actors perceive their interests similarly, there will
be only be small disparities in outcomes based on
the power distribution. But, if their perceptions of
their interests are widely divergent, power
relationships are instrumental in determining
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outcomes. Relationships of communication are
simply the channels that sending states and
emigrants utilize to maintain contact with and
knowledge of each other. Finalized activities
include the extension of rights to and the extraction
of resources from the diaspora. Although sending
states may feel threatened by the extension of
rights, this can prove to be a necessary component
of transnational sovereignty in cases where the
diaspora demands them.
Similarly, there are also three different types
of diaspora engagement policy: capacity building,
extending rights to the diaspora, and extracting
resources from the diaspora.78 Capacity building
has two key components: fostering diaspora
identification and solidarity with the homeland and
crafting appropriate governmental structures to
engage and effectively use the diaspora. To
encourage emigrants to identify as part of the
imagined community of their home country,
sending states can invoke symbols, espouse a
rhetoric of national solidarity, or try to influence
expatriate-focused media to carry their message.
States can also support institutions such as culture
and language clubs in emigrants’ host countries.
The state’s aim in this aspect of capacity building is
to create a more homogenous, and thus more easily
manageable diaspora population.79
The development of effective governmental
apparatuses to deal with the diaspora requires a
number of additional actions after the diaspora’s
identification with the homeland has been
solidified. The first step generally involves the
collection of basic information on the diaspora,
such as data on emigrant populations or existing
diaspora organizations in various host countries.
With these data in hand, states can assess the
methods they can use to manipulate their diasporas.
One effective way for states to co-opt and manage
their diasporas is creating a transnational migration
organization under the authority of the state and
treating it as a consultative organization.80
Representation of the diaspora in this manner may
allay some of the concerns of the diaspora in
whether the state is considering its interests. This
approach holds promise for states that wish to forgo
extending a more formal voice to their diasporas by
granting them voting rights, which can entail a
number of previously mentioned problems. The
process of extending rights to the diaspora was

discussed earlier, as was the extraction of
resources. Obtaining resources from the diaspora is
a matter of persuading emigrants and convincing
them that their interests include supporting their
homelands.
Some of the specific ways that sending states
can engage their diasporas have been discussed
earlier. To begin a conversation with their
emigrant populations, states can reach out to them
through existing governmental structures such as
embassies or consulates. Diaspora organizations
such as hometown associations also provide a
forum for states to engage these populations.
Besides engaging emigrants through specific
institutions, sending states can take steps to
encourage the diaspora to harbor favorable
perceptions of their homeland. For example, states
can extend political rights, encourage financial
contributions through rhetorical appeals and
financial incentives, and assert emigrants’ rights
abroad. Advocacy by sending states for their
diasporas may be especially helpful in convincing
emigrants that their home states are supporting
them and thus are worthy of reciprocal assistance.
Mexico
The successes and failures of sending
countries in engaging their diasporas are instructive
in which policies are most likely to be effective and
useful for similar states. Mexico is a classic
example of an emigration or sending state. Over
the years, it has had a consistent and significant net
outflow of people. 81 The majority of Mexican
emigrants reside in the United States. In 2000,
Mexico’s National Population Council estimated
that approximately 8,173,689 Mexican-born
individuals resided in the United States. Such a
large emigrant population centered in one host
country provides a concentrated and significant
financial flow for Mexico. In 2001, the Bank of
Mexico reported that Mexican emigrants in the
United States remitted a total of US$8.895B. In the
same year, the Inter-American Development Bank
estimated this flow of remittances at US$9.23B.82
Remittances constitute the third largest source of
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foreign capital for Mexico, falling behind only oil
exports and foreign investment.
Mexico’s relationship with its diaspora has not
always been positive or supportive. In fact, there is
a past tradition of neglect of and disdain for
emigrants among Mexican government officials as
well as intellectuals.83 Mexican emigrants were
often treated as traitors to their homeland and their
identity, having abandoned both to pursue a new
life abroad. However, this dynamic began to
change during the 1980s. In this decade, Mexican
President Carlos Salinas de Gortari courted
Mexican-American leaders and their organizations
in search of political backing and financial
contributions. From this point onward, Mexican
emigrants and their organizations began to exert
influence on both the Party of the Democratic
Revolution (PRD) and the Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI). In addition, the
revolutionary left-wing Zapatista Army of National
Liberation (EZLN) began to vie for emigrants’
loyalty in 1994.84
The increased influence of the diaspora on
Mexican domestic politics emboldened emigrants
to demand more representation and rights from the
Mexican government. During the 1990s the
Mexican government granted emigrants significant
new political rights. In 1996 Mexico launched
external voting for its citizens who resided abroad.
Additionally, Mexico amended its constitution to
permit the non-loss of Mexican nationality in the
case of a Mexican acquiring a different
citizenship.85 These are two distinct developments
and neither one is quite as beneficial for Mexican
emigrants as one would first think.
First, the adoption of external voting did
indeed allow for Mexicans abroad to cast their
votes in the 2006 presidential elections by post.86
Previously, Mexican citizens would have to return
to their home district in Mexico to cast their ballots.
The number of citizens who returned home to vote
in the past was small but meaningful.87 However,
emigrants needed a special identification card to
vote abroad. This card was issued only in Mexico,
so emigrants would in fact have to return in order to

vote if they did not already possess this
identification card.88 It is estimated that 4.2 of the
11 million Mexicans abroad possessed one of these
ID cards in 2006, but only 40,665 of these
individuals registered to vote. 89 Second, the reform
that allowed for dual nationality did not permit dual
citizenship in the more permissive sense and its
attendant voting rights. Rather, those Mexicans
abroad who had acquired a different citizenship
were allowed to regain Mexican nationality and a
few accompanying rights, including certain benefits
associated with land ownership and inheritance
rights in Mexico. This was primarily a symbolic
move that recognized these individuals as members
of the Mexican national community.
These reforms were significant however and
signaled a meaningful shift in the Mexican
government’s treatment of the diaspora. Mexican
President Vicente Fox in particular recast the image
of Mexican emigrants as a welcome and integral
part of the Mexican community. 90 This recognition
was a function of both emigrants’ demands for
rights and recognition as well as the government’s
acceptance of Mexico’s increasing dependence on
the diaspora’s remittances, investments, and
transfers of knowledge, skills, and technology. It
will take several years to determine if the actions
that Mexico has taken in recent years to draw its
diaspora into the fold will substantially increase
emigrants’ contributions.
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Nigeria
Nigeria is also a country that has a history of
shunning its diaspora. The country has failed to see
its emigrants as potential contributors to Nigeria
and its development. Rather, it has characterized
the diaspora, as well as internal migrants, as a sign
of development failure, not a source of positive
political and social change. Generally, the only
connection between migration and development in
Nigeria that has been acknowledged by the
Nigerian government is the knowledge and skills
that emigrants returning to Nigeria bring back with
them. 91 This negative perception of emigrants is
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largely a function of Nigeria’s oil supply and its
consequences. Emigration of the Nigerian elite has
long been associated with the outflow of capital
from Nigeria and the transfer of oil profits to
overseas accounts.92 As a consequence, emigrants
have been viewed as individuals removing wealth
from the country rather than contributing to it.
Beyond being economic leeches, emigrants have
also been characterized as social deviants and
traitors.
However, the emigration of individuals from
lower socioeconomics classes of Nigerian society
has in fact been financially beneficial for the state.
Even human trafficking, a serious problem in
Nigeria, has appreciably increased remittances.93
Unfortunately, Nigeria has not yet pursued a
migration or remittance-focused development
strategy, most likely because it does not hold
emigrants in high regard. Emigrants’ contributions
are no longer a resource that Nigeria can ignore, as
countries with far fewer emigrants have begun to
examine and implement policies to harness their
diasporas’ power. Nigeria must shift its current
focus on migration prevention to a more realistic
and useful orientation.
The framework for a transition to a more
effective diaspora engagement strategy may have
been laid in the late 1990s. Nigeria’s 1999
transition to democracy may bode well for future
policy related to emigrants. As mentioned earlier,
democracies are more likely than non-democracies
to extend political rights to their diasporas. From
this fact, one can generalize that democracies are
more likely to recognize and support their
diasporas. This seems to be the way Nigerian
emigrants felt at the inception of democracy, as
they have been more willing to return to the
country as well as contribute financially.
Since its transition to democracy, the Nigerian
government has taken a number of steps to engage
the diaspora. For example, a “Presidential dialogue
with Nigerians abroad” was launched in 2002, and
the government has established the Nigerian in the
Diaspora Organization (NIDO) in the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.94 This organization’s official
mission is four-fold. First, it aims to increase the
participation of the diaspora in Nigerian affairs.
Second, it serves as a communication forum
between the state and the diaspora. Third, it is
intended to improve Nigeria’s international image.

Finally, the organization is focused on building a
network of Nigerians with professional skills and
knowledge and making this data available to the
Nigerian government, the private sector, and other
actors who partner with Nigeria on development
issues.
However, Nigeria’s perception of migration as
only being beneficial when emigrants return is still
evident. The recently created Nigeria National
Volunteer Service (NNVS) was crafted to reverse
the effects of the brain drain.95 This reflects the
emphasis placed on the value of return migration.
This program has only been able to achieve the
temporary return of skilled emigrants in most cases.
Nigeria has also been largely dismissive of
remittances because it has focused instead on larger
transfers of funds, generally linked to the oil
industry. Oil revenues have made remittances less
significant as a percentage of Nigeria’s GDP.
To harness the power of its diaspora, Nigeria
must revamp its anti-emigrant image and sustain
efforts to communicate and create relationships
with the diaspora. The government must address
the exploitation of Nigerians abroad, which has
become a considerable problem, especially with
respect to human trafficking.96 Advocacy for the
human rights of emigrants will increase trust
between the government and the diaspora. Beyond
abandoning its anti-emigration stance, the Nigerian
government should embrace more liberal migration
policies. Many of its current policies are focused
on restricting the free movement of individuals.
Liberalizing migration policies may promote
development, as individuals who are freely able to
travel back and forth to a country are more likely to
view the country favorably and contribute to it.97
There are a number of other unfavorable structural
conditions that need to be remedied. High crime
rates, governmental corruption, an unfavorable
investment environment, and general insecurity
have discouraged emigrants from investing in or
returning to Nigeria.98
The Dominican Republic
The case of the Dominican Republic and its
dealings with its diaspora reflect the dynamics of
diaspora lobbying of the homeland, the
institutionalization of democracy and competitive
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party politics, and the extension of political rights
to the diaspora. Dominican emigrants have been
pressuring their home government for recognition
and political rights since the 1970s. However, until
the mid-1990s the Dominican government largely
ignored its diaspora beyond accepting the money
that these individuals remitted. In 1994, the
Dominican Constitution was amended to permit
Dominican citizens resident abroad to acquire
another citizenship without losing their Dominican
one. 99 This was a step further than the Mexican
government went in its non-loss of Mexican
nationality reform.
The diaspora became even more entwined in
Dominican politics in 1996, the year in which
competitive multi-party elections were
institutionalized in the DR. In 1996, Leonel
Fernandez, who spent most of his childhood in
New York as a legal permanent resident, was
elected President, reflecting the growing influence
of Dominican emigrants.100 In 1997, the right to
vote abroad was extended, but was not
implemented until the 2004 presidential elections.
Citizens resident abroad may vote in presidential
elections and are only permitted to cast ballots in
person from a select group of cities in five
countries: the United States, Canada, Spain, Puerto
Rico and Venezuela.101 The diaspora electorate is
particularly significant in the case of the Dominican
Republic, as the emigrant population eligible to
vote represents approximately 25% of the 5 million
voters registered in the country. 102 In 2004, of the
52,431 Dominican citizens registered abroad,
35,042 cast ballots in the presidential election,
showing an impressive turn-out rate of over 66%.103
Although the turn-out for registered voters abroad
was quite high, the vote abroad reflected only about
1% of the overall vote in this election. A
conservative estimate would predict this number to
be perhaps 10 times greater.104 Perhaps Dominican
emigrants simply wanted to be recognized by their
home government and did not have a strong desire
to actually participate in the DR’s elections.
Another possible explanation is the requirement
that Dominican voters abroad possess an

identification document that is only available in the
DR, similar to Mexico’s requirement, discouraged
many potential voters. Emigrants who were not
fully committed to participating in the Dominican
electoral process or ones whose economic means
made a return trip burdensome were unlikely to
obtain the ID card and participate in the election.
El Salvador
El Salvador demonstrates one of the other
important aspects of diasporas’ relationships with
their sending countries: hometown associations and
their contributions to development. The
institutionalization of formal democracy in El
Salvador was marked by the 1992 peace agreement
between El Salvador’s government and the rebel
FMLN. The emergence of democracy sparked
greater involvement and contributions from
Salvadorian emigrants. The main form that this
increased interaction took was in the form of
hometown associations (HTAs). HTAs are groups
in a host country that unite emigrants from the
same village, town, or general region of a sending
country. They often contribute to development
projects and other initiatives in their home region.
One particularly instructive example of a
Salvadorian HTA’s involvement with its respective
hometown that illustrates some of the problematic
aspects of HTAs involves the town of Intipucá and
the Fundación Unidos por Intipucá. Some
observers think that the relationship between these
two actors is a model of how diaspora groups can
positively contribute to development. Others think
that the Fundación’s work in Intipucá exemplifies
dependence, a lack of productivity, and the
exacerbation of social ills.105 A great deal of
money from the Fundación has flowed into
Intipucá. However, these resources have been
almost entirely spent on projects that benefit the
lower socioeconomic classes in El Salvador very
little if any at all. The allocation of funds was
decided by the Fundación’s members at its
headquarters in Washington, D.C. Members of the
Fundación are relatively well-off, and their interests
in Intipucá generally lay in the city center.
Accordingly, virtually all of the Fundación’s
donations and projects have focused on the urban
center. This has resulted in a rather glamorous,
modern city center surrounded by dismal slums
populated by desperately poor Salvadorians. In
many ways, HTAs like the Fundación constitute a
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new elite, one that reinforces the existing social
structure and contributes money in ways that serve
its own interests. In the past, there have not been
any legal or institutional measures in El Salvador to
ensure equality or the representation of different
interests in the construction of development
projects funded by the diaspora.106
Perhaps recognizing the problems associated
with “development” projects that only function to
serve elite interests, the government of El Salvador
has taken steps in recent years to encourage
diaspora groups to contribute in a more beneficial,
balanced manner. Since 2003, the government has
tried to harness Salvadorian HTAs’ interest,
engagement, and contributions through the Unidos
por la Solidaridad (United for Solidarity) program.
Unidos por la Solidaridad is a transnational
development program intended to coordinate the
actions and resources of HTAs, local communities,
and municipal and national governments on
economic and social development projects in El
Salvador.107 The key component of the program is
a contest in which municipal governments, in
conjunction with HTAs, compete for government
funds. The contest requires that each competitor
develop an investment plan as well as outline a 5year development agenda.
These measures may be beneficial in
encouraging diaspora organizations to truly
consider the impact of their intervention in their
homelands. If the actions of organizations such as
the Fundación exacerbated socioeconomic divisions
simply through miscalculations or shortsightedness, then plans such as the Salvadorian
government’s hold a great deal of promise.
However, if a diaspora organization is actively and
knowingly reinforcing elite interests, such measures
are likely to be unsuccessful. In this case, the
sending country’s government must decide whether
this financial inflow is of greater significance than
the problems that it creates. If the contributions are
deemed to be more harmful than beneficial, the
sending government should try to exclude the
money. However, this poses a number of
problems. The government must distinguish
between harmful and beneficial resource inflows,
as restricting foreign assistance in general will be
detrimental.

Haiti
The case of the Haitian diaspora illustrates a
number of dynamics involved in engaging the
diaspora, including the role that emigrants can play
in undermining the sending state’s government and
functioning as a force for political support. When
Haiti was under the leadership of President
Duvalier, the government largely tried to sever the
relationship between Haiti and Haitians abroad.108
Many members of the diaspora saw themselves as a
political alternative to his regime. Although they
could have no direct effect on the Haitian political
process because they could not vote, the diaspora
did not support the Haitian government, voiced its
discontent, and sought the ouster of Duvalier.
When Duvalier fell from power, it was
generally a result of forces other than the Haitian
diaspora’s influence or activities. However, the
transition did bode well for the diaspora. The
Haitian government began to reverse the antiemigrant policies of the Duvalier regime and
reintegrate the diaspora into the national
community. The establishment of the “10th
department,” or a 10th administrative district
focused on the diaspora was intended to open a
channel of communication and engagement
between the government and Haitians abroad.109
Although the government reached out to the
diaspora to some extent, it did not extend political
rights such as external voting or dual citizenship.
Perhaps when democracy and multi-party,
competitive elections are fully institutionalized in
Haiti the diaspora will be accorded some political
rights. The potential political contributions of the
Haitian diaspora are evident. When President
Aristide was in exile, emigrants provided him with
both political and economic support.110 The
diaspora can only become more influential as other
actors recognize it as potential resource.
India
India is an interesting example of a sending
country that, despite having a large and influential
diaspora, has tried to exclude its emigrants from its
political, social, and economic life. When India
gained its independence in 1947, the Indian
government’s, and many individual Indians’, stance
was generally that those who had left the country
108
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had forfeit their rights as Indians and should try to
integrate into their host countries as much as
possible. 111 In addition, India’s closed and
staunchly independent model of development
during its early years actively discouraged outside
influence and involvement, including the potential
contributions of the diaspora.112 India was to be
governed and recreated by true Indians alone, not
those who had abandoned the country and not by
other foreign actors.
During the 1960s and the 1970s, India
experienced a large labor exodus, as many
individuals relocated to find work in Middle
Eastern and Gulf countries.113 However, this
emigration was mostly temporary, as the host
countries desired short-term labor assistance, not
permanent immigration. The brain drain, in which
Indian professionals and intellectuals have left the
country, has been a separate phenomenon. Both
flows could have been manipulated by the Indian
government in favorable ways, drawing resources
into the country for development, but the negative
perception of emigrants proved to be a formidable
barrier. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, India
failed to open itself to migrant investment in any
significant way, retaining its closed model of
development.
At the end of 1990, India’s supply of foreign
capital was almost entirely depleted. 114 This was a
huge crisis for the government, and it began to
reconsider its stance on foreign contributions. In a
desperate move, India developed special
concessions for emigrants who invested in the
country, but the non-repatriation of capital was still
the standard for these investments. By relying on
its diaspora, India was able to avoid dependence on
the IMF and its conditional loans. Although India
granted some benefits to emigrants in this case, its
actions to address the economic crisis still represent
a missed opportunity to effectively engage the
diaspora. Outside investors, including the diaspora,
were viewed as a necessary evil and as economic
predators. Once the economy recovered beyond the
brink of collapse, economic liberalization stalled.
The contributions of Indian emigrants, who were

perceived to be corrupted by their host countries,
were ignored once again.
Since 1997, economic reforms have resumed,
but FDI remains low. This is disappointing, as the
Indian diaspora is rather wealthy, successful, and
interested in Indian affairs. In recent years, the
Indian government has developed a few initiatives
that may signal a shift in attitudes toward the
diaspora. For example, Person of Indian Origin
(PIO) cards have been introduced.115 These cards
are the equivalent of a 20-year visa and accord
certain privileges to their bearers, including special
treatment in buying property and investing in the
country. External voting was allowed for the first
time in 2004 by post or proxy, but only members of
the armed services or civil servants deployed
abroad were eligible. 116 In addition, the Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP) announced in 2002 that it would
begin the process to grant dual citizenship to
Indians resident abroad.117 The BJP likely made
this move because it is an unabashedly Hindu
nationalist organization and recognizes the
potential political benefits of doing so, as the Indian
diaspora has generally been quite supportive of
such organizations. However, the constitutional
changes necessary to institute dual citizenship have
yet to be set in motion, and it is unlikely that they
will be any time in the near future.
Eritrea
The relationship between Eritrea and its
diaspora illustrates several important aspects of
sending state-emigrant linkages, including the
selflessness that emigrants can show in contributing
to their homelands and the ways in which
previously cozy relationships can sour. Linkages
between Eritrea and its diaspora predate the
establishment of Eritrea as an independent state.
During Eritrea’s struggle for independence, the
diaspora was mobilized, especially by the Eritrean
People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) to increase
awareness of the conflict, provide political
advocacy, and raise money for the war, relief
operations, and welfare services.118 These
115
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bonds in 1999 and auctioning homes in Asmara, the
capital, to the diaspora.123
In recent years, Eritrea has become less
enthusiastic about its diaspora. It has become
concerned about emigrants’ critiques of the
government as well as the growing autonomous
linkages between the diaspora and individuals in
Eritrea. It has also been disappointed in the
diaspora’s limited success with political
advocacy.124 Eritrean emigrants have also
developed negative perceptions of the state. Many
emigrants are experiencing a growing
disillusionment and a feeling of exploitation.125
The excessive financial demands of the government
have strained the relationship between emigrants
and the state. There is overwhelming social
pressure within diaspora communities to contribute
generously to the state, with individuals often
checking on each other to ensure that everyone is
giving. This pressure, combined with emigrants’
desire to contribute to their family members in
Eritrea as well, has simply been too much for the
diaspora to handle in many cases.
States face a number of limitations in efforts to
increase their engagement with their diasporas.
First, the ever broader dispersal of emigrants can
strain resource-strapped states’ abilities to
effectively reach these populations.126 Second, the
principle of territorial sovereignty restricts states’
power in dealing with their diasporas.127 Although
they may communicate and develop relationships
with their emigrants, they generally do not wield
any coercive power over these individuals. This
can be especially problematic when the relationship
between the sending state and its emigrants is
antagonistic rather than synergistic. Although there
are a number of issues associated with engaging
and extracting resources from diaspora populations,
the importance of doing so will likely grow in the
future as migration flows continue to increase.
Sending states must assess the resources they can
potentially extract from their diasporas and plan
their engagement strategies accordingly.

contributions were vital in sustaining the
independence movement.
Recognizing the importance of the diaspora,
the Eritrean government opted for a broad
definition of citizenship at independence that was
not dependent on residence in Eritrea or an
individual’s status in his host country. In the 1993
Referendum for Independence, 84,370 votes were
cast by Eritrean emigrants. For context, it is
estimated that of a total 3 million Eritreans, 1
million are resident outside the state.119 The
diaspora was also intimately involved in the
creation of the Eritrean constitution. Although
emigrants were able to vote in the referendum on
independence, this seems to have been a one-shot
deal, as they are no longer accorded external voting
rights.120 As mentioned earlier, shortly after it
gained its independence Eritrea instituted a
voluntary 2% tax on the diaspora that the majority
of emigrants complied with.121 Eritrea’s rapid
social, economic, and political reform and
concurrent economic development and
democratization may bode well for emigrants in
obtaining more political rights including external
voting.
Eritrea called on its diaspora again during its
1998-2000 war with Ethiopia. The state took three
main steps to establish deeper connections with
emigrants.122 First, it reopened previously shuttered
political office in host states to ascertain the
demographics of the diaspora. Second, it
revitalized the Eritrean Relief Association network.
This organization operates under different names in
different countries. For example, in the United
States it is the Eritrean Development Fund. Third,
it initiated an information campaign within the
diaspora to spread awareness of Eritrea’s needs in
the war and the importance of emigrants’
contributions.
Financial contributions from the diaspora have
been especially important for Eritrea because the
state is suspicious of foreign aid. During the war
with Ethiopia, Eritrea added significant additional
financial requests to the standing voluntary 2% tax.
For example, in the United Kingdom Eritrea asked
for an additional £1 per day as well as a £500 lump
sum for 1999. The government also began issuing
119
120

Ibid., 172.
ACE Project, “Comparative Review of Voting from
Abroad,” http://aceproject.org/ace-

123

Ibid., 176-7.
Ibid., 178-9.
125
Ibid., 180.
126
Barry, “Home and Away,” 6.
127
Ibid., 6.
124

en/topics/va/comparative-review
121

Koser, “Long-Distance Nationalism,” 175.
122
Ibid.

195
Published by KnightScholar, 2012

17

Proceedings of GREAT Day, Vol. 2011 [2012], Art. 21

de Haas, Hein. “International Migration and
National Development: Viewpoints and Policy
Initiatives in Countries of Origin: The Case of
Nigeria.” International Migration Institute:
University of Oxford (June 2006). Accessed
April 8, 2011

Bibliography
ACE Project. “Comparative Review of Voting from
Abroad.” Accessed April 8, 2011
Adamson, Fiona and Madeleine Demetriou.
“Remapping the Boundaries of ‘State’ and
‘National Identity’: Incorporating Diasporas
into IR Theorizing.” European Journal of
International Relations 13 (2007): 489-526.

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral
Assistance. “Voting from Abroad: The
International IDEA Handbook.” International
Institute for Democracy and Electoral
Assistance (November 2009). Accessed April
8, 2011

African Diaspora Policy Centre. “Building
Institutional Cooperation Between the
Diaspora and Homeland Governments in
Africa: The Cases of Ghana, Nigeria,
Germany, USA, and the UK.” ADPC Policy
Brief (June 2010). Accessed April 8, 2011

Itzigsohn, Jose. “Immigration and the Boundaries
of Citizenship: The Institutions of Immigrants’
Political Transnationalism.” International
Migration Review 34 no. 4 (2000): 1126-1154.

Barry, Kim. “Home and Away: The Construction
of Citizenship in an Emigration Context.” New
York University Law Review 81 no. 11 (2006).
Accessed April 8, 2011

Itzigsohn, Jose and Daniela Villacres, “Migrant
Political Transnationalism and the Practice of
Democracy: Dominican External Voting
Rights and Salvadorean HTAs.” Ethnic and
Racial Studies 31 no. 4 (2008): 664-686.

Brinkerhoff, Jennifer M. “Exploring the Role of
Diasporas in Rebuilding Governance in PostConflict Societies.” In Africa’s Finances: The
Contribution of Remittances, 241-264. New
Castle upon Tyne, UK: Cambridge Scholars
Publishing, 2008. Accessed April 8, 2011

Keely, Charles B. and Bao Nga Tran. “Remittances
from Labor Migration: Evaluations,
Performance, and Implications.” International
Migration Review 23 no. 3 (Autumn 1989):
500-525.

Collier, Paul. “Economic Causes of Civil Conflict
and Their Implications for Policy.” In
Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict
Management in a Divided World, edited by
Chester A. Crocker et. al.: 197-218.
Washington D.C.: United States Institute of
Peace Press, 2007.

Kinvall, Catarina and Ted Svensson. “Hindu
Nationalism, Diaspora Politics, and NationBuilding in India.” Australian Journal of
International Affairs 64 no. 3 (2010): 274-292.
Lall, Marie. “Mother India’s Forgotten Children.”
In International Migration and Sending
Countries, edited by Eva Ostergaard-Nielsen,
121-139. New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2003.

Collyer, Michael and Zana Vathi. “Patterns of
Extra-territorial Voting.” Sussex Centre for
Migration Research Working Paper T22
(October 2007). Accessed April 8, 2011.

Leblang, David. “Harnessing the Diaspora: The
Political Economy of Dual Citizenship.”
University of Virginia (February 2010)
Accessed April 8, 2011.

Gamlen, Alan. “Diaspora Engagement Policies:
What are They, and What Kinds of States Use
Them?” Centre on Migration, Policy, and
Society Working Paper no. 32 (2006).
Accessed April 8, 2011

Lyons, Terrence and Peter Mandaville. “Global
Migration and Transnational Politics: A
Conceptual Framework.” George Mason
University Project on Global Migration and
Transnational Politics Working Paper no. 1
(2008). Accessed April 8, 2011.
196

https://knightscholar.geneseo.edu/proceedings-of-great-day/vol2011/iss1/21

18

Cisterino: Engaging the Diaspora

Martinez-Saldana, Jesus. “Los Olvidados Become
Heroes: The Evolution of Mexico’s Policies
Towards Citizens Abroad.” In International
Migration and Sending Countries:
Perceptions, Policies, and Transnational
Relations, edited by Eva Ostergaard-Nielsen,
33-56. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
Newland, Kathleen. “Voice After Exit: Diaspora
Advocacy.” Migration Policy Institute (2010)
Accessed April 8, 2011.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development. “International Migration
Remittances and Their Role in Development.”
International Migration Outlook (2006)
Accessed April 8, 2011.
Ostergaard-Nielsen, Eva. “International Migration
and Sending Countries: Key Issues and .” In
International Migration and Sending
Countries, edited by Eva Ostergaard-Nielsen,
3-30. NewYork: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
Portes, Alejandro, Luis E. Guarnizo, and Patricia
Landolt. “The Study of Transnationalism:
Pitfalls and Promise of an Emergent Research
Field.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 22 no. 2
(1999): 217-237.
Sachs, Susan. “New York, Citing Security, Rejects
Mexican ID Cards.” New York Times,
December 28, 2002. Accessed April 8, 2011.
The World Bank. Migration and Remittances
Factbook 2011. Washington, D.C.: The World
Bank, 2011. Accessed April 8, 2011.

197
Published by KnightScholar, 2012

19

